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In Romer v. Evans the Court drew a constitutional distinction between civil 
laws enacted for a broad public purpose that justifies “the incidental 
disadvantages they impose on certain persons,” and laws that have “the 
peculiar property of imposing a broad and undifferentiated disability on a 
single named group”.1 Laws of the second kind “raise the inevitable 
inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class 
of persons affected.”2 The difficulty lies in deciding when the inference 
properly becomes a conclusion that the law violates the Equal Protection 
Clause. The more sweeping and unusual the burdens imposed on the targeted 
group, the more difficult it may be to discern a common policy explaining 
them other than the forbidden purpose of harming their targets. At some point 
the animus inference becomes strong enough to require scrutiny of the laws’ 
purported rationale, including whether it has any actual basis in fact. An 
astonishingly broad array of burdens are imposed today on anyone ever 
convicted of almost any sexual offense of any kind or seriousness, including 
but extending far beyond inclusion in publicized websites listing “sex 
offenders.” No similar regime has ever been imposed on any other group of 
law-abiding former felons who have fully served the sentence for the crime 
 
* Distinguished Affiliated Scholar, Center for the Study of Law and Society, University of 
California, Berkeley and Merriam Distinguished Professor of Law and Affiliate Professor of 
Psychology (Emeritus), Arizona State University.  Special thanks are due David Goldberg 
and Tara Ellman, whose careful review led to my destruction of this paper’s primitive 
ancestors, to Joe Grodin for telling me to carry on anyway, to Hal Cohen for challenging me 
to persuade him, and to Eric Janus, J.J. Prescott, and Tamara Lave for both their suggestions 
and their own important work on these issues, from which I’ve greatly benefitted. 
1 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632, 635 (1996). 
2 Id. at 633. 
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they committed years earlier. This “registry regime” raises an inference of 
animus at least as strong as in any of the four cases in which the Court 
sustained such claims, and the explanation that the laws are justified by the 
clearly valid purpose of reducing the incidence of sexual offending does not 
survive the scrutiny of scientific studies which find the registry ineffective and 
often counterproductive. Nor does the fact that many sexual offenses are 
never reported to law enforcement authorities cast doubt on the validity of 
those studies or on the legal or policy analyses that employ them. Much of 
the registry regime must therefore fall under an Anti-Animus principle. 
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For the past three decades public policies aimed at suppressing 
criminal sexual conduct have focused particularly on preventing re-offending 
by those released from custody after having already been convicted and 
punished for a sexual offense.3 Its central feature is the sex offender registry. 
The registration requirement applies to a broad range of offenses: rape, of 
course, but also non-penetrative sexual contact in various forms, including 
unconsented touchings, a host of non-contact offenses (such as voyeurism, 
indecent exposure, and possession of sexualized pictures of minors) and 
sometimes nonsexual offenses that a court concludes were committed with a 
 
3 Allegra M. McLeod, Regulating Sexual Harm: Strangers, Intimates, and Social 
Institutional Reform, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1553, 1554-55 (2014). 




sexual motive.4  All states, encouraged by federal law, require those 
convicted of the covered offenses to register in person at least annually but 
as often as monthly.5 In some states the registration obligation continues for 
life; in other states it may end after ten or 20 years, but only for some 
registrants.6 As of December, 2018, there were nearly a million Americans 
covered by the registration system.7 As detailed below in Part I, the 
registration requirement generally triggers other consequences imposing 
serious burdens on those reached by it, including restrictions on where they 
may live, go, or work. 
 
 
4 Alissa R. Ackerman, Andrew J. Harris, Jill S. Levenson & Kristen Zgoba, Who Are the 
People in Your Neighborhood? A Descriptive Analysis of Individuals on Public Sex Offender 
Registries, 34 INT. J. L. PSYCHIATRY 149, 156 (2011); Andrew J. Harris, Jill S. Levenson & 
Alissa R. Ackerman, Registered Sex Offenders in the United States: Behind the Numbers, 60 
CRIME & DELINQUENCY 3, 28 (2014). 
5 Federal law requires registrants to appear in person to confirm the continued accuracy of 
registration information annually, semi-annually, or quarterly, depending on the offense 
triggering the registration obligation. 34 U.S.C. § 20918. Homeless registrants may be 
required to reregister much more often. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.011 (2011), 
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=PEN&sectio
nNum=290.011 [perma.cc/GYY8-9E7H] (requiring “transients” to reregister every 30 days). 
Registration obligations arise from a combination of federal and state laws. Federal law 
requires states to enact sex offender registration laws that meet specified minimum federal 
standards to avoid penalties in federal funding for law enforcement activities, but most states 
have chosen to adopt non-compliant registry laws, either to save money or because they do 
not agree with the required federal policy. LISA N. SACCO, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43954, 
FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT IN SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION: OVERVIEW 
AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, IN BRIEF 6; Jennifer N. Wang, Paying the Piper: The Cost of 
Compliance with the Federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 59 N.Y.L. SCH. 
L. REV. 681, 694-95 (2014). Federal law also imposes registration requirements directly on 
registrants but provides no federal registration system. Compliance therefore requires 
registration in the relevant state, which can present difficulties for registrants when federal 
rules require registrations that their state law does not. See, e.g., Willman v. United States, 
972 F.3d 819, 823 (6th Cir. 2020) (concluding that a sex offender's obligations under federal 
law are independent of duties under state law); Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs. v. Doe, 
94 A.3d 791, 802 (Md. 2014) (addressing whether Maryland may remove sex offender 
registration information from its registry when there is a federal obligation to register in one's 
home state).   
6 See 50-State Chart on Relief from Sex Offender Registration, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES 
RES. CTR., https://ccresourcecenter.org/state-restoration-profiles/50-state-comparison-relief 
-from-sex-offender-registration-obligations/ [perma.cc/35XM-59WV] (last updated June 
2019) (documenting pervasive use of different lengths of time for required registration 
depending on offense or recidivist status). 
7 NAT'L CTR FOR MISSING AND EXPLOITED CHILDREN, REGISTERED SEX OFFENDERS IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND ITS TERRITORIES PER 100,000 POPULATION (2018), https://web. 
archive.org/web/20190301234132/http:/www.missingkids.org/content/dam/pdfs/SOR%20
Map%20with%20Explanation_10_2018.pdf [perma.cc/JJA8-QS5E]. 
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 Most of those additional burdens did not yet exist (or were not part of 
the record) when Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) rejected a claim that Alaska 
violated the Constitution’s ex post facto clause by applying its newly enacted 
registry law to those convicted before its enactment. The Court concluded the 
ex post facto clause did not apply because the registry was a civil regulation 
reasonably designed to reduce sexual offending in light of the “frightening 
and high” re-offense rates of those convicted of sexual crimes. The Court’s 
dramatic but erroneous characterization of this re-offense risk reverberated 
through the cases that followed over the next decade, underpinning a series 
of decisions in state and federal courts turning back constitutional objections 
to the registry.8 But later, and especially after social science scholarship 
increasingly established both the Court’s error, and the very limited or 
nonexistent contribution to public safety provided by the registry and the 
additional restrictions triggered by it (the “registry regime”), the tide began 
to turn. Several state and federal courts concluded that at least parts of the 
registry regime do constitute punishment, thus barring their retroactive 
application. These decisions have typically relied in part on social science 
evidence that the registry regime does not advance public safety, leading to 
the conclusion that it therefore serves no non-punitive purpose and therefore 
constitutes punishment.9  
Part I of this article capsules the harsh and sweeping nature of the 
restrictions the registry regime imposes on people who have already fully 
served the criminal sentence imposed on them for their offense, and shows 
why, under a line of cases that stretch from Department of Agriculture v. 
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) to United States v Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 
(2013), they give rise to the inference they are based on unconstitutional 
animus toward those affected by them and are therefore barred as civil 
regulations if that inference cannot be overcome. Part II reviews the social 
science that shows why the existing registry regime does not in fact further 
the important policy purpose (public safety) offered to justify it, leading to 
the conclusion that the inference of animus cannot be overcome. Finally, Part 
III examines a recent reply to that social science evidence advanced by two 
scholars and a distinguished judge, that the studies are flawed because they 
rely on official crime statistics which necessarily omit the large proportion of 
sexual offenses that are not reported to law enforcement authorities.10 It 
 
8 Ira Mark Ellman & Tara Ellman, “Frightening and High”: The Supreme Court’s Crucial 
Mistake About Sex Crime Statistics, 30 CONST. COMMENTARY 495, 497 (2015). 
9 See cases cited infra notes 44 and 45. 
10 See Nicholas Scurich & Richard S. John, The Dark Figure of Sexual Recidivism, 37 
BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 158, 160 (2019) (arguing that it should not be assumed that released 
sexual offenders did not commit new sexual offenses just because they were not charged); 
Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929, 933 (7th Cir. 2016) (arguing that arrest rates are not 
necessarily linked to the rate of occurrence for underlying offenses because sexual offenses 
are systematically underreported). 




shows that their argument is grounded on a mistaken understanding of the 
policy question put by the challenge to the registry regime, as well as of the 
social science evidence its challengers rely upon. It shows why, when the 
policy question and the social science evidence are properly understood, the 
case against the registry regime is almost certainly strengthened, not 
weakened, by the underreporting phenomenon. 
 
I. THE NATURE AND HISTORY OF REGISTRY REGIME GIVES RISE TO THE 
INFERENCE THAT IT IS BASED ON UNCONSTITUTIONAL ANIMUS 
 
 Registration, or conviction for a registrable offense, triggers a host of 
additional consequences. Most registrants are publicly identified as “sex 
offenders” on official state websites, which are in turn linked to a national 
system maintained by the federal government intended to allow national 
searches by anyone.11 These public listings may include the registrants’ 
address and place of employment.12 State and local laws often restrict where 
registrants may live,13 frequently resulting in their becoming homeless14 and 
even causing their forced evictions from nursing homes or hospices.15 In 
some states registrants who have completed their sentence may nonetheless 
be kept in prison because they cannot find a place to live that complies with 
the state’s residency restrictions.16 They may be forced to move on 30 days’ 
notice, requiring their children to change schools mid-year, because a new 
park or child care facility opened that is closer to their home than the 
minimum distance specified by statute.17 Separate presence restrictions limit 
where they may go, with the result that a registrant may be unable to enter a 
 
11 WAYNE LOGAN, KNOWLEDGE AS POWER: CRIMINAL REGISTRATION AND COMMUNITY 
NOTIFICATION LAWS IN AMERICA 55-62 (2009). 
12 Id. at 63-64. 
13 Joanne Savage & Casey Windsor, Sex Offender Residence Restrictions and Sex Crimes 
Against Children: A Comprehensive Review, 43 AGGRESS. VIOLENT BEHAV. 13, 13–15 
(2018). 
14 Deanna Cann & Deena Scott, Sex Offender Residence Restrictions and Homelessness: A 
Critical Look at South Carolina, 31 CRIM. JUST. POL'Y REV. 1119, 1120-23 (2020); Savage 
and Windsor, supra note 14, at 15; Valerie Schneider, The Prison to Homelessness Pipeline: 
Criminal Record Checks, Race, and Disparate Impact, 93 IND. L. J. 421, 433 (2018). 
15 Izzy Kapnick, Sex Offender Fights Removal From Hospice, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. 
(Sep. 9, 2016), https://www.courthousenews.com/sex-offender-fights-removal-from-hos 
pice/ [perma.cc/XG78-DYFP]. 
16 Johnson v. Superintendent, 163 N.E.3d 1041, 1045 (N.Y. 2020); Allison Frankel, Pushed 
Out and Locked In: The Catch-22 for New York’s Disabled, Homeless, Sex-Offender 
Registrants, 129 YALE L.J.F. 279, 280 (2019).  
17 Vasquez v. Foxx, 895 F.3d 515, 517 (7th Cir. 2018); Vasquez v. Foxx: Seventh Circuit 
Holds Sex Offender Residency Restriction Does Not Violate Ex Post Facto Clause, 132 
HARV. L. REV. 2352, 2353 (2019). The plaintiff’s claim that the forced move would disrupt 
his daughter’s schooling did not avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim on any of the 
constitutional grounds alleged. Id.  
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public school to meet his child’s teacher or watch his child’s performance in 
a play or athletic event. Indeed, in some states a registrant can commit a crime 
by entering a public park to fetch his own child.18 State laws bar registrants 
from a broad range of occupations, including haircutting, plumbing, selling 
hearing aids, land surveying, and working in a dialysis facility.19 Federal law 
bars registrants from housing programs permanently.20 Their access to 
computers or smartphones are limited or barred altogether for years after their 
release, and sometimes indefinitely,21 which further burdens their ability to 
find employment or maintain social connections. 
 When a registrant in one state travels to another state, he must register 
in that state—within a time period that varies from state to state and is often 
short enough that weekend visits can trigger the registration obligation.22 
Simple vacation trips, or even commutes across state lines, can thus become 
traps for the unwary who inadvertently commit registration offenses that 
carry the potential for significant prison sentences. Some states routinely 
require registrants to wear ankle bracelets enabling round-the-clock location 
monitoring, sometimes for life.23 Others require the driver’s license of 
 
18 People v. Legoo, No. 124965, 2020 Ill. LEXIS 543, at *2, *13 (2020); see also Jacob 
Sullum, Two Federal Courts Call BS on Banning Sex Offenders From 'Child Safety Zones', 
REASON (2016), https://reason.com/2016/12/05/two-federal-courts-call-bs-on-banning-se/ 
[perma.cc/Y6XE-Y5NW] (stating that a North Carolina sex offenders list prevented five 
offenders from accessing various public spaces and activities). 
19 Tracy Jan, After Prison, a Lifetime of Economic Punishment, WASH. POST, (Sep. 3, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/business/jobs-after-prison-rhode-island-
recently-occupational-licensing/ [perma.cc/W668-RGWL]; Matt Mellema, Not Wanted: Sex 
Offenders, SLATE, (August 14, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/ news_and_politics/ 
jurisprudence/2014/08/several_states_ban_people_in_the_sex_offender_registry_from_a_b
izarre_list.html [perma.cc/DNQ4-LBF8]. 
20 42 U.S.C. § 1366; 24 C.F.R. § 5.856 (2018); 24 C.F.R § 960.204(a)(4) (2018); 24 CFR § 
982.553(a)(2) (2018). See also Corinne A. Carey, No Second Chance: People with Criminal 
Records Denied Access to Public Housing, 36 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 545, 562 (2005) 
(explaining that Congress mandates public housing authorities to reject applicants who are 
subject to state sex offender registration laws). See generally David Thacher, The Rise of 
Criminal Background Screening in Rental Housing, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 5, 7, 12–13, 
23 (2008) (arguing that criminal history, including being on the sex offenders registry, play 
a role in preventing prior offenders from accessing rental housing). 
21 Jacob Hutt, Offline: Challenging Internet and Social Media Bans for Individuals on 
Supervision for Sex Offenses, 43 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 663, 664-65 (2019). 
22 Shawn M. Rolfe, When a Sex Offender Comes to Visit: A National Assessment of Travel 
Restrictions, 30 CRIM. JUST. POL'Y REV. 885, 891-96 (2019). 
23 See Commonwealth v. Feliz, 119 N.E.3d 700, 705 (Mass. 2018) (noting that “[m]ore than 
3,900 individuals in the Commonwealth, on probation, pretrial release, and parole, are 
subject to court-ordered GPS monitoring,” some of them pursuant to a law requiring judges 
to impose monitoring for individuals convicted of sex offenses); H.R. v. New Jersey State 
Parole Bd., 213 A.3d 617, 619 (N.J. 2020) (describing a state law requiring high-risk sex 
offenders to submit to GPS monitoring). 




registrants to contain a stamp identifying them as sex offenders.24 The 
passport of any registrant convicted of an offense involving a minor 
(including non-contact offenses such as viewing explicit pictures of anyone 
under eighteen) must contain a notation identifying him as a sex offender, 
part of a broader federal program to restrict the international travel of all 
registrants.25 Because registrants are denied the right given other citizens to 
obtain permanent residency status for their family members, their spouses 
and children who are foreign nationals cannot remain in the United States.26 
One common result is forced separation when registrants cannot follow their 
evicted family to their foreign home because of the other laws restricting 
registrants’ international travel.27   
 These examples of burdens imposed by law are predictably 
supplemented by private actions triggered by the identification of registrants 
on publicized websites as “sex offenders.”28 As noted by the Alaska Supreme 
Court, “[i]nternet publication of sex offender registration information 
potentially inflicts grievous harms on sex offenders ranging from public scorn 
and ostracism to harassment, to difficulty in finding and maintaining 
 
24 Carney v. Okla. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 875 F.3d 1347, 1350 (10th Cir. 2017); Doe v. 
Marshall, No. 2:15-CV-606-WKW [WO], 2018 WL 1321034, at *5 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 14, 
2018). 
25 In addition to the passport stamps, the same laws establish the “Angel Watch” program 
under which the State Department notifies the destination countries of any planned 
international travel by any registrants, no matter their offense. The interlocking statutory 
provisions that combine to produce these results, part of the International Megan’s Law, Pub. 
L. No. 114-119, § 8, 130 Stat. 24 (2016), are codified in various locations as described in 
Daniel Cull, International Megan’s Law and the Identifier Provision—An Efficacy Analysis, 
17 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 181, 185 (2018). See also Jacob Sullum, Scarlet-Letter 
Passports Are Unjust and Irrational, REASON.COM, (Nov. 11, 2017), https://reason.com 
/2017/11/01/scarlet-letter-passports-are-unjust-and/ [perma.cc/2ABW-DU3R] (describing 
the unjust and irrational system of restricting international travel for people on the sex 
offender registry). 
26 The Adam Walsh Act precludes citizens from petitioning for immediate relative status if 
they were convicted of a “specified offense against a minor. ” 8 USC § 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I). 
An offense against a minor is broadly defined to include “[a]ny conduct that by its nature is 
a sex offense against a minor.” 34 U.S.C. § 20911(7)(I). 
27 Many countries outside of continental Europe refuse admission to anyone with a sex 
offender passport stamp or when the U.S. has notified the country of the traveler’s sex 
offense conviction under the Angel Watch program. Registrant International Travel Matrix, 
REGISTRANT TRAVEL ACTION GROUP , http://registranttag.org/resources/travel-matrix/ 
[perma.cc/NQ63-L5R9] (last updated Aug. 2021). For accounts of registrants forced to 
separate from their families because of these laws, see True Stories, WELCOME TO 
FIGHTAWA, https://fightawa.org/awatruestories/ [perma.cc/PK6Q-CYVC] (last updated 
Feb. 4, 2021) (showcasing stories of families separated because of the Adam Walsh Act). 
28 LOGAN, supra note 12, at 64. 
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employment, to threats of violence and actual violence.”29 Their spouses and 
children are often ostracized.30 Their families are more likely to disintegrate, 
denying sex offenders the support important to rehabilitation. Those who try 
to help them may become targets themselves.31 Indeed, programs to help 
released offenders re-integrate into society often exclude those with a sexual 
offense conviction.32 New crimes become more likely when reintegration into 
civil society as productive citizens becomes more difficult. 
 The package of burdens, imposed by these laws and the private 
actions they encourage, is extraordinary in at least two ways. First, no other 
category of individuals who have completed their criminal sentence, 
including any term of parole or supervised release, is subject to anything 
remotely similar. Those who have completed their sentence for crimes like 
murder or drug dealing need not usually worry about their registration 
obligations in every state they enter, or locational bars on where they may go 
or live, or a stamp on their driver license or passport. And this disparity gets 
worse as recent criminal justice reforms intended to soften the much smaller 
group of collateral consequences routinely imposed on former felons 
typically exclude registrants from their grace. Recent examples include their 
exclusion from reforms that allow other ex-felons to vote33 or to serve on a 
jury,34 but there are others.35  Second, the American registry regime is an 
international outlier. Even though many countries maintain sex-offense 
registries  available to law enforcement personnel, virtually none “permit[s] 
the prevalent U.S. practice of proactive notification of sex-offense registry 
 
29 Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 444 P.3d 116, 130 (Alaska 2019); see also Jill Levenson & 
Leo P. Cotter, The Effect of Megan’s Law on Sex Offender Reintegration, 21 J. CONTEMP. 
CRIM. JUST. 49, 61-63 (2005) (explaining how the ostracization of individuals on the sex 
offender registry creates a host of bad outcomes, including job loss and threats or 
harassment). 
30 Jill Levenson & Richard Tewksbury, Collateral Damage: Family Members of Registered 
Sex Offenders, 34 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 54, 57 (2009). 
31 Brandon Stahl, Well-Meaning Family Takes in Sex Offender, Inciting Fear and Outrage, 
MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., (Oct. 1, 2016), https://www.startribune.com/well-meaning-
family-takes-in-sex-offender-inciting-fear-and-outrage/395526731/ [perma.cc/6V9X-
PS33]. 
32 See, e.g., To Seek Admission, DELANCEY STREET FOUND., (2020), http://www.delancey 
streetfoundation.org/admission.php [perma.cc/SM29-9N2S] (stating that the organization 
does not accept sex offenders because they need professional counseling). 
33 FLA. STAT. § 98.0751 (2021). 
34 For instance, the California Code of Civil Procedure excludes registrants, but not others 
convicted of a felony, who have completed their term of parole or probation from jury 
service. CAL. CIV. PROC. 203(a)(11), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/ codes_display 
Section.xhtml?lawCode=CCP&sectionNum=203 [perma.cc/HTM5-YGG9]. 
35 See Catherine L. Carpenter, All Except for: Animus that Drives Exclusions in Criminal 
Justice Reform, 50 SW. L. REV. 1, 9-17 (2020) (describing ways that states implemented 
changes like sentence reclassification and increased eligibility for parole, among other 
initiatives, to reform the criminal justice system). 




information to unlimited community organizations and the general public.”36 
After reviewing the practices of other countries, as well as the social science 
evidence, the American Law Institute approved a revision to the Model Penal 
Code that eliminates entirely all publicly accessible websites listing “sex 
offenders”, as well as any other forms of general public notification 
concerning them, and prohibit or limit other collateral consequences currently 
applied to them alone. 
 I here refer to those burdened by this registry regime as registrants, 
although sometimes the burden in question is triggered directly by their prior 
conviction rather than by their inclusion on the registry. In either case, finite 
public resources that could be available for other crime control strategies are 
devoted instead to imposing these unprecedented burdens on them. In 2008 
the cost of complying with the then newly enacted federal standards for sex 
offender registration laws was alone estimated at $59 million in California, 
$30 million in Florida, and $39 million in Texas, equivalent to $74 million, 
$37 million, and $49 million in today’s dollars.37 This is above and beyond 
the baseline costs these states already incurred implementing the registry laws 
they already had in effect. Both the public costs and the private burdens are 
justified by the premise that registrants pose a distinctively greater threat of 
sexual offending than do others: if prior offenders commit a large share of 
sexual offenses, then this regulatory focus on their lives is a more effective 
strategy for suppressing criminal sexual conduct than other programs 
government might fund instead. A policy justification for this selective 
imposition of serious burdens is necessary because the registry regime is a 
constellation of civil regulations and not punishment. The registration regime 
cannot be justified as punishment for the registrant’s sexual offense because 
its rules do not meet constitutional requirements for imposing punishment, in 
at least three ways.  
 First, registry regime rules are often applied to persons whose crimes 
predate their adoption. This was the case in Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2002), 
in which the Supreme Court upheld this retroactive application of Alaska’s 
newly adopted sex offender registry. But to reach this result Smith had to first 
reject the claim that registration itself constituted punishment, because if it 
 
36 A.L.I., Model Penal Code: Sexual Assault and Related Offenses, §213 (2021) (available 
as Tentative Draft No. 5 at https://www.ali.org/projects/show/sexual-assault-and-related-
offenses/#_status [perma.cc/68R8-QU8F]). See generally TERRY THOMAS, THE 
REGISTRATION AND MONITORING OF SEX OFFENDERS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (2011). 
37 What Will It Cost States to Comply With the Sex Offender Registration and Notification 
Act?, JUST. POL'Y INST. (2008), http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/08-08_FAC_ 
SORNACosts_JJ.pdf [perma.cc/8GXY-MLYY]. Current dollar values can be calculated 
using the Bureau of Labor Statistics CPI inflation calculator. CPI Inflation Calculator, U.S. 
BUREAU LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Nov. 
11, 2021) [perma.cc/Y93N-QCA5]; see also Wang, supra note 6, at 705 (discussing how 
states must consider financial costs in deciding whether to implement SORNA). 
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was punishment its retroactive application would violate the ex post facto 
clause. Alaska prevailed only because Smith held its registry was a civil 
regulation, to which the ex post facto clause had long been held 
inapplicable.38 Second, states and the federal government routinely impose 
registry regime burdens on individuals because of conviction in another 
jurisdiction, which they could not do if registration was punishment. If states 
could punish  for convictions in another state, they could also put new arrivals 
back in prison if they believed the sentence they served in their former state 
was too short. That is obviously not allowed. And finally, and most 
fundamentally, punishment is necessarily imposed case by case, following 
procedures that comply with constitutional Due Process requirements 
necessary to justify its imposition on the particular individual. The legislature 
may of course set the range of punishments available to a court to impose on 
a person duly convicted, as part of each individual adjudication,39 but it 
cannot, independently of any judicial process, impose punishment by statute 
on specified individuals or groups it simply does not like, even if the dislike 
is understandable.40 
 A state cannot evade the constitutional requirements for imposing 
punishment by labeling the punishing regulation “civil”. Courts can look 
beyond the label. The test is multi-factor, but the key is whether the 
legislature in fact intended to punish, or, if not, whether the statutory scheme 
is nonetheless “so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State’s] 
intention to deem it ‘civil’”.41 A law’s failure to advance any permissible 
public policy is one indicator of its punitive purpose.42 And so recently, two 
federal courts of appeal  held that Smith does not bar challenges to current 
registry regime rules that now include burdens going beyond annual 
registration, because the burdens’ cumulative impact constitutes punishment 
that cannot be imposed retroactively.43 A number of state high courts have 
reached the same result.44 Other courts, however, continue to rely on Smith 
 
38 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 400 (1798). 
39 WAYNE LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING. & ORIN S. KERR, CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE, 1249–52 (5th ed. 2009). 
40 E.g., U.S. v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 461 (1965). 
41 Doe v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 700 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 55 (2017) 
(quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997)). 
42 Id. at 704. 
43 Does v. Wasden, 982 F.3d 784, 793 (9th Cir. 2020) (reversing trial court dismissal of 
claims that Idaho registry was punitive and violated ex post facto clause); Snyder, 834 F.3d 
at 706 (holding that provisions of the Michigan registry law imposed punishment in violation 
of the ex post facto clause).  
44 Doe v. State, 111 A.3d 1077, 1100 (N.H. 2015); Riley v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 98 A.3d 
544, 555 (N.J. 2014); Starkey v. Okla. Dep't of Corr., 305 P.3d 1004, 1030 (Okla. 2013); 
Commonwealth v. Baker, 295 S.W.3d 437, 44 (Ky. 2009); State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 22–
23, 26 (Me. 2009). 




to reject challenges to the registry regime, finding them civil regulations not 
limited by the ex post facto clause.45  
 The challengers’ focus on ex post facto claims requires them to argue 
that the registry regime is punishment, because the Ex Post Facto Clause does 
not otherwise apply. But a different way to frame their objection would 
challenge its validity as a set of civil regulations. Success would then bar their 
application prospectively as well as retroactively. When a civil regulation 
targets and burdens just a small group of individuals, one ought to be able to 
explain why that targeting furthers the public policy offered to explain its 
adoption. This contrasts with the burden imposed by punishment following 
conviction of a crime, which requires no such public policy rationale to 
explain it. Although punishment may serve utilitarian considerations such as 
general deterrence, the desire to make the convicted criminal suffer (within 
the wide boundaries set by the Eighth Amendment’s bar on punishment that 
is “cruel and unusual”) is entirely adequate as a constitutional matter. That is, 
after all, what punishment means. But the state cannot target a small group 
with civil regulations imposing punishing burdens just because it wants that 
group’s members to suffer. As the Supreme Court explained years ago in 
United States v. Moreno, if “‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, 
it must at the very least mean that a bare [legislative] desire to harm a 
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental 
interest.”46 Targeting a particular group for special burdens requires a 
rationale that is plausibly connected to a permissible policy purpose.47 
 The Moreno principle has not often been invoked. We are far more 
accustomed to the usual rule that successful Equal Protection or substantive 
 
45 E.g., Shaw v. Patton, 823 F.3d 556, 559-61, 577 (10th Cir. 2016); State v. Yeoman, 236 
P.3d 1265, 1269 (Idaho 2010); Smith v. Commonwealth, 743 S.E.2d 146, 151 (Va. 2013); 
Kammerer v. State, 322 P.3d 827, 839–40 (Wyo. 2014). In addition, one federal circuit 
concluded that retroactive application of registration amendments to an offender did not 
violate the ex post facto clause. Doe v. Cuomo, 755 F.3d 105, 109–12 (2d Cir. 2014). 
46 U.S. Dep’t. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–35 (1973). 
47 At the limit, a purportedly civil enactment targeting small groups of people for punishment 
amounts to a forbidden Bill of Attainder. Some burdens the registry regime places on 
registrants, such as exclusion from specified vocations, fall squarely within the understood 
meaning of “punishment” for this purpose. See Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 
474 (1977) (explaining that an impermissible legislative punishment includes a “legislative 
enactment barring designated individuals or groups from participation in specified 
employments or vocations . . . .”). The key question then becomes whether punishment was 
the legislative purpose. Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 613 (1960). While the indicators 
of animus combined with the refusal to take account of evidence that the registry regime 
does not advance its stated purpose certainly suggests a punitive purpose, the Court has at 
times applied a demanding standard of proof. Id. at 619 (stating that “unmistakable evidence 
of punitive intent” is required to strike down a Congressional enactment). Especially as some 
important burdens created by the registry regime, such as listing on the public website, may 
not constitute punishment for Bill of Attainder purposes, claims based on the Moreno-Romer 
line of cases described in the text may be more apt. 
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Due Process challenges require a showing that the challenged rule burdens a 
suspect class or a fundamental (or very important) constitutional right. 
Moreno stands out because neither prerequisite was present there: the 
decision struck down a regulation limiting hippies’ access to food stamps. 
But Moreno is not a complete outlier. It has had echoes. City of Cleburne 
later made clear that in applying the Moreno principle, courts may scrutinize 
the government’s justifications to distinguish real explanations for the 
challenged rule from pretextual ones. And so Cleburne struck down a local 
zoning ordinance that required special permits for group homes for the 
intellectually disabled, but not for fraternity houses or hospitals. Because the 
city’s stated concerns about “crowded conditions” and the like could not 
explain this differing treatment, the Court concluded the real reason was “an 
irrational prejudice” against the intellectually disabled.48  
 Another label for “irrational prejudice” is “animus,” which is the 
word the Court used in the third case in this line, in which it struck down a 
state constitutional amendment that barred enactment of anti-discrimination 
laws protecting gay men and lesbians. No one claimed the state was required 
to enact such anti-discrimination laws, of course. Indeed, at the time of this 
1996 decision, both private and governmental discrimination against 
homosexuals was common and lawful. But because the “sheer breadth” of 
the state’s constitutional bar on enacting anti-discrimination rules protecting 
them could not be explained by any legitimate state interests, the Court 
concluded the initiative was “inexplicable by anything but animus.”49 And 
animus, at least with respect to civil regulations, is a forbidden legislative 
purpose. The Moreno principle can thus be described as an Anti-Animus 
principle, as one leading scholar has done.50 
 There’s no doubt, as Professor Carpenter has observed, that the Anti-
Animus principle is undertheorized.51 But he makes a persuasive case that it 
is nonetheless the best explanation not only for Moreno, Cleburne, and 
Romer, but for also the Court’s later decision in U.S. v. Windsor.52 Windsor 
held the federal government could not refuse to recognize a same-sex 
marriage that New York, the couple’s home state, treated as valid.53 The 
Court reached that result without holding sexual orientation to be a suspect 
class, nor by relying on a claim that the federal rule unjustifiably burdened a 
fundamental right to marry.54 Nor did it say the federal government may 
 
48 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985). 
49 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).  
50 Dale Carpenter, Windsor Products: Equal Protection from Animus, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 
183, 207 (2014).  
51 See id. at 204 (arguing that decisions like Windsor, Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer can be 
understood as animus decisions but must be “more fully linked and theorized”). 
52 570 U.S. 744, 765 (2013). 
53 Id. at 749-53. 
54 See id. at 769-75.  




never decline to recognize as valid for federal law purposes a marriage 
concededly valid under the law of the spouses’ home state. It sometimes 
can.55 The opinion’s avoidance of these more familiar doctrines has led some 
critics to see it as a muddle.56 But as Carpenter explains,57 one thing all the 
Windsor justices agreed upon was that a law driven by animus denies Equal 
Protection to those it targets. Where they differed was on whether such 
animus was in fact shown in Windsor. A majority concluded it was, relying 
especially on Romer.58 We can also look to Romer along with Windsor for 
guidance in identifying laws motivated by forbidden animus.  
 The laws in both Windsor and Romer had two features the Court 
found important. The first was the imposition of “discriminations of an 
unusual character” on an unpopular group.59 Such unusual tactics invite 
suspicion.60 The unusual feature of Romer was its erecting a barrier to 
legislative relief applicable only to one group. In Windsor it was the law’s 
singular departure from the strong tradition of federal deference to state 
policies in domestic matters. The second important feature is the broad scope 
of the questioned law. Romer involved a state constitutional amendment that 
worked a “sweeping and comprehensive . . . change in the legal status” of the 
narrow group affected by it.61 The Court detailed dozens of state laws, local 
ordinances, regulations, and executive actions revoked by the challenged 
amendment.62 The law at issue in Windsor excised same-sex couples in one 
fell-swoop from more than a thousand federal statutes and regulations that 
made marital status relevant to the widely varying questions with which they 
dealt.63 It becomes difficult to discern a common thread of public policy tying 
together the broad swath of issues addressed by such sweeping enactments, 
other than the intent to harm the small group it burdens.  The registry regime 
of course presents both features. The sweep of rules is breathtakingly broad, 
and includes numerous burdens never before imposed on any other group of 
people not currently under the supervision of the criminal justice system. 
 
55 E.g., as Windsor itself observed, federal immigration law does not recognize marriages 
“entered into for the purpose of procuring an alien’s admission [to the United States] as an 
immigrant” despite the fact that the marriage is valid under state law, which does not 
ordinarily consider the spouses’ reason for marrying relevant to recognizing their marriage’s 
validity. Id.at 765; 8 U.S.C. §1186a(b)(1) (2006 & Supp. V 2006). 
56 See articles collected by Carpenter, supra note 51, at 190-91, n. 28. I freely borrow from 
Professor Carpenter’s analysis of the anti-animus principle in these paragraphs. 
57 Id. at 189. 
58 Windsor, 570 U.S. at 768, 770–77. 
59 Id. at 744, 768 (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 633).  
60 As Carpenter observes, an “extraordinary and unprecedented act requires an extraordinary 
and unprecedented justification apart from the self-justifying desire to demean or injure a 
stigmatized class of people.” Carpenter, supra note 51, at 217. 
61 517 U.S. at 627. 
62 Id. at 628. 
63570 U.S. at 765. 
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 Sweeping measures imposing an unusually broad array of burdens 
exclusively on a small and unpopular group ought to raise an inference of 
animus. Perhaps one could explain away the inference by reference to a 
permissible public purpose. But explanation is needed. The point is to 
distinguish laws enacted for a broad public purpose that justifies “the 
incidental disadvantages they impose on certain persons,” and laws that have 
“the peculiar property of imposing a broad and undifferentiated disability on 
a single named group.”64 As Romer concludes, laws of the second kind “raise 
the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity 
toward the class of persons affected.”65 The more sweeping the burdens 
imposed, and the narrower the targeted group, the more closely one should 
examine the state’s asserted purpose for the law. In both Romer and Windsor 
a single law burdened the targeted group across a broad range of contexts. 
For registrants, the burden comes from the cumulative impact of many 
laws—federal, state, and local—that together impose a startlingly broad set 
of harms on their common target. There is no reason why the inference of 
animus should be less in that case. To the contrary, it is strengthened by this 
piling on, as new restrictions, new methods of public shaming, and new 
harms are added year after year, jurisdiction after jurisdiction.  
 The history of these laws is also suggestive. As construction of the 
registry regime began in the 1990’s, the narrative surrounding the adoption 
of laws about sexual offending changed. It became personal, as Logan has 
noted.66 Many of the new laws, both federal and state, were named after a 
victim in one or another well-publicized case, typically involving a 
particularly disturbing fact pattern—abduction and sexual abuse of a child by 
a stranger (Megan’s Law, Jacob Wetterling Act, Adam Walsh Act are 
perhaps the best-known examples).67 Though such cases are atypical (just 2% 
of reported sexual offenses against children under twelve are committed by 
strangers, much less strangers who abduct a child68) they nevertheless 
 
64 Romer, 517 U.S. at 632, 635. 
65 Id. at 634. 
66 LOGAN, supra note 12, at 49. 
67 Id.; see also Irina Fanarraga, What’s in a Name? An Empirical Analysis of Apostrophe 
Laws, 21 CRIM. JUST. 1, 2 (2020) (explaining that sexual abuse laws are often named after 
victims in highly publicized cases). 
68For minors twelve to seventeen years old, the comparable figure is 4%. These figures, and 
all others referenced here, are derived from the online data extractor provided by  National 
Incident Based Reporting System maintained by National Center for Juvenile Justice, 
available at https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezanibrsdv/asp/selection_vov.asp [perma.cc/ 
E9Y3-4CE8]. This system collects incidents known to local law enforcement agencies in 
thirty-eight cooperating states and the District of Columbia and reported by them to the FBI. 
Methods, NAT’L CTR. FOR JUV. JUST. (2018), https://www.ojjdp.gov/ ojstatbb/ezanibrsdv/ 
asp/methods.asp [perma.cc/8UCP-K9AY]. The most recent available data available through 
this tool on August 5, 2020, when the statistics provided here were obtained, was for 
 




became the understood context in any discussion of registry laws. So 
strangers committing sexual assaults on children became the image of the 
laws’ intended target even though hardly anyone affected by these laws had 
ever committed such a crime. It is therefore not surprising that discussions of 
the new registry regime laws took on a personal tone not seen in earlier 
debates over sexual offense laws adopted in prior decades. Registrants were 
now described as “beasts”, “monsters”, “animals”, and the “human 
equivalent of toxic waste”.69 The mayor of one city explained it had adopted 
residency restrictions for registrants that went beyond any imposed by state 
law in order “to do anything we could to make sex offenders uncomfortable”, 
and a key figure behind Florida’s adoption of harsh registry laws expressed 
the same sentiment.70 In these examples the animus motivating the laws is 
not hidden. The popular belief, adopted by legislators, is that all those reached 
by the registry are threats to commit the horrific stranger attacks against 
 
incidents occurring in 2016. The sexual offense data reported in this article were obtained by 
using the tool to compile all incidents of “rape, sodomy, sexual assault with object, and 
fondling” broken down by age and the relationship of victim and perpetrator. (These four are 
the only sexual offense categories separately tabulated; other registerable offenses, such as 
possession of sexualized pictures of minors or indecent exposure, are aggregated in other 
categories such as “public order” offenses). The percentages are calculated excluding from 
the denominator incidents in which the relationship was unknown. Id. 
Murder victims are tabulated under murder, as the most serious charge, and are thus 
omitted in the count of sexual offenses supplied by this tool even if there was also a sexual 
offense. But this group’s omission from the sexual offense category is unlikely to affect the 
overall percentages noted here because the total number of murders is very small. There were 
211 murders of victims under twelve for the entire year, compared to 22,959 sexual offenses. 
There were 174 murders of victims aged twelve to seventeen compared to 28,430 sexual 
offenses. Easy Access to NIBRS Victims, 2016: Victims of Violence, Row Variable: Most 
serious offense against victim, Column Variable: Age of victim, NAT’L CTR. FOR JUV. JUST. 
(2018), https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezanibrsdv/asp/selection_vov.asp  
[perma.cc/VMV3-MM6E].  
Seven percent of the murders were known to have been committed by strangers, but 
the victim-perpetrator relationship was unknown in 78 of the 174) cases. Id. showing Row 
Variable: Most Serious Offense Against Victim, Column Variable: Victim Offender 
Relationship, Selected for: victims aged 12 to 17 [perma.cc/8N6D-QQFB].  
The victim was a male in 130 of the 174 murders, perhaps suggesting that many 
were related to gang violence or drugs rather than sexual offending. For murder victims under 
twelve years old, 109 of the 211 were males. Id. showing Row Variable: Age of Victim, 
Column Variable Sex of Victim, Selected for: Murder [perma.cc/9AA8-3L5M].  
69 LOGAN, supra note 12, at 95.  
70 Dan Boyd, Two Sex Offender Bills Supported by Keller Contained Differences, 
ALBUQUERQUE J., (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.abqjournal.com/1087241/two-sex-
offender-bills-supported-by-keller-contained-differences.html [perma.cc/7LVH-
BLVU]. The documentary film Untouchables includes interviews with the figure behind 
Florida’s very harsh registry regime laws, who also suggests his goal was to make life for 
Florida registrants so difficult that they would leave. UNTOUCHABLES (Blue Lawn 
Productions 2016). 
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children memorialized by the laws’ names, even if some had not yet been 
caught at it, and so are malevolent people who deserve such treatment.71 
 There is animus when registrants are not considered as individuals but 
as members of a group all damned by fundamental and probably permanent 
character flaws making them likely to engage in evil conduct. The very label 
“sex offender” applied to registrants encourages that understanding.  People 
are often disinclined to support treatment for those convicted of sex crimes 
in the belief that it won’t work because they cannot be reformed.72 But 
providing people with accurate information is not necessarily enough to 
eliminate animus. For example, one study found potential jurors were twice 
as likely to commit a felon labelled “sexually violent predator” to an 
indefinite term of confinement, as compared to others with the identical 
criminal records and risk assessment reports who were not so labeled. Their 
harsher treatment of those labelled “sexual predators” was not explained by 
a refusal to believe the risk assessment reports: they did believe them, as they 
agreed that the labelled offenders were no more dangerous or likely to 
reoffend than the unlabeled ones. What mattered was that for the labeled 
offenders, jurors reported a greater desire to “get revenge” and to “make the 
offender pay”.73  
 Such studies suggest the public is not very concerned about the 
practical usefulness or efficacy of sexual offender crime control measures 
because it believes these laws’ burdens fall only on evil people who deserve 
them. The official sex offender label is easily seen as certifying their evil 
status, thus justifying such attitudes. It’s thus not surprising that surveys find 
most people support websites publicizing registrants’ “sexual offender” 
status, restrictions on where registrants can live or go, and even their 
castration, without regard to whether there is any evidence such policies 
reduce sexual offending.74 But adopting laws because they burden people 
seen as evil, without regard to whether they serve any public policy, is of 
course the very definition of acting from animus. 
 The label “sex offender” is not a psychological diagnosis. It is a legal 
classification triggered by a single conviction for any crime on a long list that 
 
71 Kelly M. Socia & Andrew J. Harris, Evaluating Public Perceptions of The Risk Presented 
by Registered Sex Offenders: Evidence of Crime Control Theater?, 22 PSYC. PUB. POL'Y. L. 
375, 382 (2016). 
72 Christina Mancini & Kristen Budd, Is the Public Convinced That “Nothing Works?”: 
Predictors of Treatment Support for Sex Offenders Among Americans, 62 CRIME 
DELINQUENCY 777, 780 (2016). 
73 Nicholas Scurich, Jennifer Gongola & Daniel A. Krauss, The Biasing Effect of the 
“Sexually Violent Predator” Label on Legal Decisions, 47 INT. J. L. PSYCHIATRY 109, 109 
(2016).   
74 Jill S. Levenson, Yolanda N. Brannon, Timothy Fortney & Juanita Baker, Public 
Perceptions About Sex Offenders and Community Protection Policies, 7 ANAL. SOC. ISSUES 
PUB. POL'Y 137, 150 (2007). 




ranges in both nature and seriousness. The evidence that animus toward 
registrants lies behind the laws that burden them should require scrutiny of 
whether the burdens in fact further the valid policy purpose offered to explain 
them. That scrutiny requires a look behind the “sex offender” label, to ask 
both if most so labeled in fact present a special risk of harm to others, and 
whether the burdens selectively imposed on them actually suppress sexual 
offending. Nor, as Carpenter points out,75 can that inquiry ignore advances in 
our understanding of the burdened group. The forced expulsion of lepers to 
separate colonies was once thought necessary to protect the public from a 
disfiguring disease that evoked fear and disgust, but today that explanation 
would not work. Given what we now know about the disease’s transmission 
and treatment with antibiotics76 exiling lepers from civil society could today 
be explained only by “irrational prejudice”—animus.  
 Registrants are today’s lepers. The intuition that they threaten grave 
harm which the registry regime can prevent might have once been plausible, 
but no longer. It must now yield to the facts established by several decades 
of studies. Part II capsules that work.  
 
II. STUDIES SHOW THAT MOST REGISTRANTS ARE UNLIKELY TO 
REOFFEND, AND THAT THE REGISTRY REGIME CONTRIBUTES NOTHING 
TO REDUCING RE-OFFENSE RISK ANYWAY 
 
 Three groups of studies establish the registry regime’s limited value 
as a strategy for reducing sexual offending. One group focuses on two 
particular burdens imposed by these laws: the public identification of 
registrants as “sex offenders” through tools likes websites and mailings to 
neighbors, and locational restrictions on where registrants may live or be 
present. Despite the contrary intuitions of some public officials, the studies 
find these measures contribute little or nothing to reducing the prevalence of 
sexual offending.77 Their findings do not depend on any assumptions 
 
75 Carpenter, supra note 51, at 225. 
76 Natasha Frost, Quarantined for Life: The Tragic History of US Leprosy Colonies, HIST. 
(Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.history.com/news/leprosy-colonies-us-quarantine [perma.cc/ 
5KHR-7VZT]; Leper colony, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/ index.php?title= 
Leper_colony&oldid=1005596663 [perma.cc/W8XL-29UJ] (last visited Feb. 8, 2021) . 
77 Amanda Y. Agan, Sex Offender Registries: Fear Without Function?, 54 J.L. & ECON. 207, 
235 (2011); Jeff A. Bouffard & LaQuana N. Askew, Time-Series Analyses of the Impact of 
Sex Offender Registration and Notification Law Implementation and Subsequent 
Modifications on Rates of Sexual Offenses, 65 CRIME DELINQUENCY 1483, 1506 (2019); 
SARAH NAPIER, CHRISTOPHER DOWLING, ANTHONY MORGAN & DANIEL TALBOT, AUSTL. 
INST. OF CRIMINOLOGY, TRENDS & ISSUES IN CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, NO 550, WHAT 
IMPACT DO PUBLIC SEX OFFENDER REGISTRIES HAVE ON COMMUNITY SAFETY 7 (2018); 
Savage and Windsor, supra note 14, at 680; Kristen Zgoba, Bonita M. Veysey & Melissa 
Dalessandro, An Analysis of the Effectiveness of Community Notification and Registration: 
Do the Best Intentions Predict the Best Practices?, 27 JUST. Q. 667, 688 (2010). 
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concerning the rate at which registrants commit a new sexual offense after 
release. Most show simply that the offense rate, whatever it is, is no different 
with these laws than without them. One study, by the Minnesota Department 
of Corrections,78 adopted a different methodology. Minnesota had no 
statewide law imposing locational residency restrictions on registrants; the 
study’s purpose was to assess whether it should. It reviewed the records for 
every one of the 224 individuals convicted of a sex offense who was released 
from a Minnesota prison between 1990 and 2002 and then incarcerated again 
by 2006 for a new sex offense. It examined the facts of each of the 224 re-
offenses to determine how many might have been prevented had Minnesota 
barred registrants from living within a mile of a school, park, playground, 
daycare center, or “other location where children are known to congregate.” 
The conclusion: there was not even a single case in which such locational 
restrictions would have prevented the perpetrator’s contact with the juvenile 
victim.79 
 A second group of studies tells us that even if laws targeting released 
registrants did have some effect on their re-offense rates, they would not have 
much effect of sexual offending generally. That’s because 95% or more of all 
those arrested for sexual offenses are first offenders necessarily unaffected 
by the registry regime rules (and this was the case before there was any 
registry regime).80 The registry regime’s apparent premise—that a large share 
of sexual offenses are committed by a small group who offend again after 
completing a sentence for an earlier sexual conviction—is thus mistaken.81 
 
78 MINN. DEP'T. OF CORR., RESIDENTIAL PROXIMITY & SEX OFFENSE RECIDIVISM IN 
MINNESOTA 8 (2007).  
79 Id. at 23–24. 
80 Sarah W. Craun, Catherine A. Simmons & Kristen Reeves, Percentage of Named 
Offenders on the Registry at the Time of the Assault: Reports From Sexual Assault Survivors, 
17 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1374, 1379 (2011); Jeffrey C. Sandler, Naomi J. Freeman & 
Kelly M. Socia, Does a Watched Pot Boil? A Time-Series Analysis of New York State’s Sex 
Offender Registration and Notification Law, 14 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y L. 284, 298 (2008). 
81 ANDRA TETEN THARP, KEY FINDINGS: RETHINKING SERIAL PERPETRATION 2 (2015). One 
arena in which this debate has taken place is the college campus. An analysis of the two 
largest longitudinal studies of college men’s sexual violence, based on interviews with them 
upon arrival in college and during the four subsequent spring semesters, found that 10.8% of 
the men reported behavior that met the FBI definition of rape, before or during their college 
years, but that relatively few repeated the offense in a later year. Kevin M. Swartout, Mary 
P. Koss, Jacquelyn W. White, Martie P. Thompson, Antonia Abbey & Alexandra L. Bellis, 
Trajectory Analysis of the Campus Serial Rapist Assumption, 169 JAMA PEDIATRICS 1148, 
1150-52 (2015). In other words, the campus problem is not so much that a few college men 
are repeat sexual offenders, as that a disturbingly large percentage have offended at least 
once. (It is also worth noting that women of college age who are not in college are more 
likely than college women to suffer sexual assault). AYA GRUBER, THE FEMINIST WAR ON 
CRIME: THE UNEXPECTED ROLE OF WOMEN’S LIBERATION IN MASS INCARCERATION 154–69 
(2020); SORI SINOZICH & LYNN LANGTON, DEP'T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., RAPE 
 




One can’t have much impact on the overall incidence of sexual offenses by 
concentrating efforts on a group that accounts for less than 5% of them. The 
law’s focus on registrants recalls the classic story of the fellow who tries to 
help a drunk searching for his keys under a streetlamp. After a while he asks 
the drunk if he’s sure this is where he lost them. “Oh no”, is the reply. “I lost 
them in the park. But this where the light is.”82 If we want to make a real dent 
in sexual offending rates, we must bring light to the park. Searching harder 
under the streetlamp won’t help. And that is true no matter the overall rate of 
sexual offending if most offenses are in the park. 
 And finally, a third group of studies helps explain why prior offenders 
constitute such a small proportion of those arrested for sexual offenses: their 
overall re-offense rates are far lower than the Supreme Court, as well as other 
courts and public officials, have often assumed.83 There’s no doubt that some 
registrants are more likely than other felons to commit a sexual offense, but 
in fact most of them never do. This is true whether “re-offense” is defined as 
a new arrest for a sexual offense, or a new conviction for one. A study by the 
Criminal Justice Planning and Policy Division of the State of Connecticut 
reports results typical of such state-conducted studies.84 The authors tracked 
all 14,398 men released from Connecticut prisons in 2005, and broke out the 
746 among them who had ever served a sentence for a sexual offense 
(whether or not it was the offense that led to their most recent incarceration). 
Twenty-seven of these 746 (3.6%) were arrested and charged with a new 
sexual offense during the five-year follow-up period, of whom twenty (2.7% 
of 746) were convicted of a new sexual offense.85 Of the 13,652 released 
prisoners with no sexual offense history, 259 (1.9%)86 were arrested for a 
sexual offense within five years of release, and 114 (0.8%)87 were convicted 
of one.  
 Similar results were found in a federal study that followed for nine 
years a sample of men released in 2004 from state prisons in thirty states 
(accounting for 77% of all those released from state prisons).88 It found that 
 
AND SEXUAL ASSAULT VICTIMIZATION AMONG  COLLEGE-AGE FEMALES, 1995-2013 at 4 
(2014). 
82Streetlight Effect, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/ index.php?title=Streetlight_ 
effect&oldid=970822782 [perma.cc/XFM9-YSWG] (last visited Aug. 20, 2020). 
83 Ellman & Ellman, supra note 9, at 508. 
84 IVAN KUZYK, STATE OF CONN. OFF. OF POL'Y AND MGMT, RECIDIVISM AMONG SEX 
OFFENDERS IN CONNECTICUT 4 (2012). https://portal.ct.gov/-/media/OPM/CJPPD 
/CjResearch/RecidivismStudy/before-2020/SEXOFFENDERRECIDIViSM2012 
FINALpdf.pdf. 
85 Id. at 29. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88MARIEL ALPER & MATTHEW R. DUROSE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., 
RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS RELEASED FROM STATE PRISON: A 9-YEAR FOLLOW-UP 
(2005-14) 1 (2019). 
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7.7% of those who had been incarcerated for rape or sexual assault were 
arrested for new rape or sexual assault by the end of the nine year period, as 
compared to the 3.4% rape and sexual assault arrest rate for those whose most 
serious prior offense was robbery, a 2.5% rate for those whose most serious 
prior offense was a property crime, and a 2.3% rate for all categories of 
released prisoners combined, excluding any with a sexual offense convictions 
before the new arrest.89 Other studies also find a sexual offense rate around 
2% for released felons with no prior sexual offense history.90  
 So while, not surprisingly, those once convicted of a sexual offense 
are on average more likely to be arrested for one than those convicted of only 
nonsexual offenses, the difference is not as great as many expect. If more 
than 90% of those burdened by the rules would not reoffend in any event, 
policymakers ought to reconsider whether the funds spent on their 
implementation might be better redirected to other strategies. Such 
redirection is also suggested by the companion finding of the federal study: 
released felons with no sexual offense history accounted for 84.4% of all the 
rape or sexual assault arrests of released prisoners over the nine-year follow-
up period it considered91 (because, of course, there were so many more of 
them).92    
 It is also important to note a feature common to these and many other 
re-offense rate studies: they survey new sexual offenses committed by 
individuals released from prison. That means they almost certainly 
overestimate the re-offense rate of all those convicted of sexual offense 
 
89 Id. at 4, tbl.Table 2. 
90 Rachel E. Kahn, Gina Ambroziak, R. Karl Hanson, David Thornton, Release from the Sex 
Offender Label, 46 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV.. 861, 862 (2017). 
91 ALPER & DUROSE, supra note 89 at 11 tbl. 9. There are, of course, many more released 
felons with no conviction for a sexual offense than those with one.  
92 Many arrested for a sexual offense will have had no prior convictions of any kind, much 
less prison sentences for a sexual offense. There is thus no inconsistency between studies 
that find 95% of all those arrested for a sexual offense have no prior sexual offense 
conviction, and this study’s finding that 84% of released prisoners arrested for a sexual 
offense had no prior sexual offense conviction. One may also note that the five-year sexual 
offense re-arrest rate reported in the federal 30-state study was 5.9% (this figure is derived 
by adding the percentages in years one through five shown in Table 5 of ALPER & DUROSE, 
supra note 89, at 7), higher than the 3.6% rate found in the Connecticut study. A likely reason 
is that the samples are different: The Connecticut study reports the rate across all persons 
released from prison after any sexual offense, while the federal study is reporting on persons 
released from prison who had convictions for rape or sexual assault. We can also compare 
these data to those in a frequently cited study of adult males convicted of “violent” sexual 
offenses and released in 1994 from a different sample of prisons in fifteen states. PATRICK 
A. LANGAN, ERICA L. SCHMITT & MATTHEW R. DUROSE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., BUREAU OF 
JUST. STAT., RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS RELEASED FROM PRISON IN 1994 25–26 (2003). 
The study found that after three years 5.3% had been arrested for a new sexual offense, which 
compares to 4.4% after three years in the 30-state study. Id. at 26, n.51. Here again, the likely 
explanation for the different rates is differences in the samples. 




because those released from prison are a higher-risk subset of all those 
convicted of a registerable sex offense. Not everyone convicted of a sexual 
offense is sent to prison. Some are sent to a county jail (because they are 
given short sentences), or are placed on probation. But repeat offenders, or 
those regarded by prosecutors or judges as higher risk, are more likely to be 
sent to prison. This is true for felons generally, not just sexual offenders.93 
That means those with prior offenses, as compared to first offenders, are over-
represented in samples of released prisoners. And we know repeat offenders 
are more likely to offend again, than are those with only one offense. That 
point is illustrated by the federal study itself, which reports that the smaller 
group of first offenders (those with only one sexual offense) among those in 
the study had a three-year sexual re-offense rate of 3.3%, much lower than 
the 5.3% overall rate the study found. 94  
 The distinction between first offenders and repeat offenders is an 
example of a difficulty that plagues many discussions of “sex offender” re-
offense rates. The focus on an overall “sex offender” re-offense rate ignores 
the heterogeneity of the population reached by the registry regime, an 
oversight that also explains inattention to the characteristics of the particular 
population for which a re-offense rate is reported in any given study. Their 
implicit assumption is that the sample’s characteristics do not matter very 
much because all those reached by the registry regime share a common 
heightened re-offense risk. But they do not. Two easy examples of low-risk 
registrant populations are female offenders and males whose only known 
sexual offense is possession of illicit images of minors. Because there are so 
few repeat offenders in both groups, it is a difficult challenge for risk 
assessment experts to sample them in sufficient numbers to identify 
distinctive traits necessary to develop statistically valid tools for predicting 
those in either group most likely to offend again.95 Re-offense risk also varies 
among men released after conviction for ordinary contact sexual offenses, 
and widely used and easily administered actuarial tools can measure 
 
93 Leon Neyfakh, Why Do So Many Ex-Cons End Up Back in Prison? Maybe They Don’t, 
Says a Provocative New Study, SLATE (Oct. 19, 2015), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/ 
2015/10/why-do-so-many-prisoners-end-up-back-in-prison-a-new-study-says-maybe-they-
dont.html [perma.cc/FUA3-LKZH]; William Rhodes, Gerald Gaes, Jeremy Luallen, Ryan 
Kling, Tom Rich & Michael Shively, Following Incarceration, Most Released Offenders 
Never Return to Prison, 62 CRIME DELINQUENCY 1003, 1020–21 (2016). 
94 LANGAN, SCHMITT, ERICA L., AND DUROSE, MATTHEW R., supra note 93 at 26. 
95 Thomas H. Cohen, Predicting Sex Offender Recidivism: Using the Federal Post 
Conviction Risk Assessment Instrument to Assess the Likelihood of Recidivism Among 
Federal Sex Offenders: Predicting Sex Offender Recidivism, 15 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 
456, 472–74 (2018); Ethan Marshall, Holly A. Miller, Franca Cortoni & L. Maaike Helmus, 
The Static-99R Is Not Valid For Women: Predictive Validity in 739 Females Who Have 
Sexually Offended, 33 SEXUAL ABUSE 631, 632 (2020). 
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individual risk.96 There is, in other words, no basis for treating all registrants 
as a high risk when most are not and we can tell who is.  
 There’s also a second important source of variation in registrant re-
offense risk that’s missed by studies that look only at overall rates for all 
registrants: the re-offense risk for anyone convicted of a crime declines 
rapidly over time at liberty, after release from custody, without re-
offending.97 That includes those convicted of sexual offenses: The likelihood 
they will be arrested for another sexual offense is approximately halved for 
every five years at liberty without a new sexual offense arrest.98 It is not 
possible to formulate a sensible policy concerning the post-release treatment 
of sexual offenders, like other offenders, without taking this critical fact into 
account.  
 So those convicted of sexual offenses vary considerably in the re-
offense risk they present at the time of their release from custody, and then 
again during the years that follow. These two phenomena—varying risk at 
the time of release, and reduction in risk with time arrest-free in the 
community—interact. The lower the initial risk posed by a group of 
offenders, the sooner after release the risk approaches zero for those who 
remain arrest-free. That pattern is shown by studies employing the most 
widely used and validated actuarial tool measuring the re-offense risk for 
most adult male sexual offenders, the Static-99R.99  
 The importance of these findings is illustrated by a recent California 
study reporting the distribution of measured risk in a random sample of 371 
adult male California registrants released from prison during 2006–2007.100 
 
96 R. Karl Hanson, Andrew J. R. Harris, Leslie Helmus & David Thornton, High-Risk Sex 
Offenders May Not Be High Risk Forever, 29 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 2792, 2793 
(2014) [hereinafter Hanson et al., High Risk Sex Offenders]; R. Karl Hanson, Andrew J. R. 
Harris, Elizabeth Letourneau & L. Maaike Helmus, Reductions in Risk Based on Time 
Offense-Free in the Community: Once a Sexual Offender, Not Always a Sexual Offender, 24 
PSYCH. PUB. POL'Y L. 48, 57 (2018) [hereinafter Hanson et al., Reductions in Risk]; Seung 
Lee et. al, The Predictive Validity of Static-99R for Sexual Offenders in California: 2016 
Update (2016), https://saratso.org/pdf/ThePredictiveValidity_of_Static_99R_ forSexualOff 
enders_inCalifornia_2016v1.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5CH-HHG3]. 
97 Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura, Redemption in the Presence of Widespread 
Criminal Background Checks, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 327, 338–44 (2009); Megan C. Kurlychek, 
Shawn D. Bushway & Robert Brame, Long-Term Crime Desistance and Recidivism 
Patterns—Evidence from the Essex County Convicted Felon Study: Long-Term Crime 
Desistance and Recidivism, 50 CRIMINOLOGY 71, 72 (2012). 
98 David Thornton, R. Karl Hanson, Sharon M. Kelley & James C. Mundt, Estimating 
Lifetime and Residual Risk for Individuals Who Remain Sexual Offense Free in the 
Community: Practical Applications, 33 SEXUAL ABUSE 3, 18–19 (2019). 
99 Hanson et al., Reductions in Risk, supra note 97, at 57; Hanson et al., High-Risk Sex 
Offenders, supra note 97, at 2795. 
100 Seung Lee et al., The Predictive Validity of Static-99R Over 10 Years for Sexual Offenders 
in California: 2018 Update (2018), http://saratso.org/pdf/Lee_Hanson 
 




Based on their Static-99R scores, the study divided the released registrants 
into five risk categories, from “Well Above Average” to “Very Low”. Only 
33 of the 371 (8.8%) were in the “Well Above Average” category, with 
another 74 (20%) classified above average in re-offense risk. More than 70% 
of registrants were in the three lowest categories, “Average,” “Below 
Average,” and “Very Low.” The “Average” group reaches a 2% re-offense 
risk before their tenth year at liberty. That means that by then, only 2% of 
those still offense-free after ten years will be arrested for a sexual offense in 
the future. 98% will not. Their 2% re-offense rate is much lower than the 
3.4% of robbers in the Connecticut study arrested for rape or sexual assault 
within nine years of release, and less than the 2.3% rate for all released 
offenders with no prior sexual offense convictions. The Below Average 
group reaches this 2% benchmark before the fifth year after their release, 
while the lowest risk group is at 2% lifetime risk at the time of their release. 
 Even if we look only at the riskiest 10% of these California registrants 
who had been sentenced to prison, we find that about two-thirds are never 
again arrested for a sexual offense. More importantly, by the fifteenth year 
after their release we pretty much know who the law-abiding two-thirds are, 
because nearly all those who offend again already have.101 This is important 
because the burdens imposed by registry regimes typically continue for life 
for higher risk registrants, and certainly past fifteen years, despite the decline 
in re-offense risk over time at liberty without re-offending. And while most 
registry regimes separate registrants into risk levels, their sorting criteria are 
usually inconsistent with the applicable social science learning, subjecting 
registrants to the registry regime for periods unjustified by their risk levels.102  
 These studies explain the scholarly consensus that emerges from the 
dozens of peer-reviewed articles published over the last two decades: the 
registry regime is not sensible policy because so many registrants do not 
present the heightened offense risk assumed by many policymakers, because 
registrants account for less than 5% of known offenses, and because the 
regime’s common strategies, public identification of registrants as “sex 
offenders” and restrictions on where they may live and go, are ineffective in 
achieving their goal of reducing sexual offending, and may even risk 




101 Hanson et al., Reductions in Risk, supra note 97, at 57. 
102 Kristin Zgoba, Michael Miner, Jill Levenson, Raymond Knight, Elizabeth Letourneau & 
David Thornton, The Adam Walsh Act: An Examination of Sex Offender Risk Classification 
Systems, 28 SEXUAL ABUSE J. RSCH. TREATMENT 722, 728 (2016). 
103 Factors that reduce the likelihood of reoffending include employment, Megan Denver, 
Garima Siwach & Shawn D. Bushway, A New Look at the Employment and Recidivism 
Relationship Through the Lens of a Criminal Background Check: Criminal Background 
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preventative and rehabilitative strategies would be more effective,104 and 
these preventative strategies could be expanded if funds spent on the registry 
were spent instead on them.  
 It has thus seemed clear for some time that the burdens the registry 
regime imposes on those reached by it do not serve the policy purposes 
offered to justify them, while there are other little-used strategies that may. 
Yet legislatures continue to enact measures imposing and increasing these 
burdens. Their adoption arises from the same kind of animus that motivated 
 
Checks and Recidivism, 55 CRIMINOLOGY 174, 196 (2017), as well as housing and social and 
family support, Grant Duwe, Can Circles of Support and Accountability (CoSA) Significantly 
Reduce Sexual Recidivism? Results from a Randomized Controlled Trial in Minnesota, 14 J. 
EXP. CRIMINOLOGY 463,481 (2018). The registry regime makes them all more difficult to 
achieve. It is thus not surprising that some studies find the registry regime actually increases 
rather than reduces re-offending. J.J. Prescott & Jonah E. Rockoff, Do Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification Laws Affect Criminal Behavior?, 54 J.L. & ECON. 161, 164–
65 (2011). 
104 Primary prevention strategies that keep people from offending in the first place are 
potentially more effective than focusing exclusively on reoffending because, as we have 
seen, re-offending accounts for only small proportion of all reported offenses. Though 
challenging to develop and implement, there is evidence that some do work. Sarah DeGue, 
Linda Anne Valle, Melissa K. Holt, Greta M. Massetti, Jennifer L. Matjasko & Andra Teten 
Tharp, A Systematic Review of Primary Prevention Strategies for Sexual Violence 
Perpetration, 19 AGGRESSION AND VIOLENT BEHAV. 346, 352–53 (2014); Charlene Y. Senn, 
Misha Eliasziw, Paula C. Barata, Wilfreda E. Thurston, Ian R. Newby-Clark, H. Lorraine 
Radtke & Karen L. Hobden, Efficacy of a Sexual Assault Resistance Program for University 
Women, 372 N. ENGL. J. MED. 2326, 2332–33 (2015); Klaus M. Beier, Umut C. Oezdemir, 
Eliza Schlinzig, Anna Groll, Elena Hupp & Tobias Hellenschmidt, “Just Dreaming of 
Them”: The Berlin Project for Primary Prevention of Child Sexual Abuse by Juveniles 
(PPJ), 52 CHILD ABUSE NEGL. 1, 2 (2016); Gabriela N. Mujal, Meghan E. Taylor, Jessica L. 
Fry, Tatiana H. Gochez-Kerr & Nancy L. Weaver, A Systematic Review of Bystander 
Interventions for the Prevention of Sexual Violence, TRAUMA VIOLENCE ABUSE 381, 392–
93 (2019). See Linda A. Anderson & Susan C. Whiston, Sexual Assault Education Programs: 
A Meta-Analytic Examination of Their Effectiveness, 29 PSYCH. WOMEN Q. 374, 381 (2005) 
(stating that college sexual assault education programs had significant average effect sizes 
on rape attitudes, rape-related attitudes, rape knowledge, behavioral intent, and incidence of 
sexual assault). And there are also promising prevention strategies to prevent re-offending 
that do not depend on the registry. See, e.g., R. Karl Hanson, Guy Bourgon, Leslie Helmus 
& Shannon Hodgson, The Principles of Effective Correctional Treatment Also Apply To 
Sexual Offenders: A Meta-Analysis, 36 CRIM. JUSTICE BEHAV. 865, 881(2009); Duwe, supra 
note 104, at 481; Lisa L. Sample, Brooke N. Cooley & Tusty ten Bensel, Beyond Circles of 
Support: “Fearless”—An Open Peer-to-Peer Mutual Support Group for Sex Offense 
Registrants and Their Family Members, 62 INT. J. OFFENDER THERAPY COMPAR. 
CRIMINOLOGY 4257, 4261–62 (2018). See also Theresa A. Gannon, Mark E. Olver, Jaimee 
S. Mallion & Mark James, Does Specialized Psychological Treatment for Offending Reduce 
Recidivism? A Meta-Analysis Examining Staff and Program Variables as Predictors of 
Treatment Effectiveness, 73 CLIN. PSYCH. REV. 101752, 5–7 (2019) (finding that treatment 
was associated with offense-specific and general recidivism reductions and that programs 
with consistent input from a qualified psychologist had best results). 




the laws targeting hippies and gay people—animus that led the Court, in 
Moreno, Romer, and Windsor, to find the laws constitutionally defective.  
 
III. LOW REPORTING RATES FOR SEXUAL CRIMES PROBABLY 
STRENGTHEN THE CONCLUSION THAT THE REGISTRY REGIME 
CONTRIBUTES NOTHING TO PREVENTING SEXUAL OFFENDING 
 
 Victims of crimes do not always report them. Getting an accurate 
count of unreported crimes is obviously difficult. The most common method 
relies on the National Crime Victimization Survey conducted by the 
Department of Justice.105 This survey of a nationally representative sample 
of households asks individuals aged twelve or over about the details of each 
victimization they experienced over the prior six months, including whether 
they reported it to the police.106 The percentage of victimizations that 
respondents say they reported is calculated for each crime category. This is 
the reporting rate most commonly referenced. The most recent available 
report, tabulating the results of the 2018 survey, found that only 42.6% of all 
violent crimes were reported to the police,107 essentially unchanged from the 
levels found in the 2016 and 2017 surveys.108 The reporting rate for rape and 
sexual assault bounces around more, almost certainly because of the smaller 
sample size for this narrower crime category.109 It was 23% in 2016, then 
40% in 2017, and then back to 25% in 2018.110 
 While it’s thus difficult to get a firm figure for the proportion of sexual 
offenses victims never report, it seems certain that it’s substantial. Nor do we 
have a firm idea of why victims do not report, although there are many 
plausible possibilities. These include embarrassment, fear of retaliation, or 
fear that one’s account won’t be believed. Surveys that ask victims why they 
do not report sometimes yield surprising results: one common response in 
 
105 A study jointly supported by the National Academy of Sciences and the Bureau of Justice 
Statistics provides a comprehensive overview of the sources of data on sexual crimes. See 
generally CANDACE KRUTTSCHNITT, WILLIAM D KALSBEEK & CAROL C. HOUSE, 
ESTIMATING THE INCIDENCE OF RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT (Nat'l Rsch. Council ed. 2014). 
106 Eligible household members are interviewed every six months for three and a half years, 
initially in person and later in person or by phone. Crimes that occur with such frequency 
that a victim cannot distinguish details of individual incidents are called series crimes; the 
victim is asked about details of the most recent incident. Id. at 59-63. 
107 RACHEL E. MORGAN & BARBARA OUDEKERK, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. 
STAT., CRIM. VICTIMIZATION, 2018 8 tbl. 5 (2019) [hereinafter MORGAN 2018]. 
108 RACHEL E. MORGAN & JENNIFER L. TRUMAN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. 
STAT., CRIM. VICTIMIZATION, 2017, 7 tbl. 6 (2018) [hereinafter MORGAN 2017]. 
109 E.g., Sharon L. Lohr, How Many Sexual Assaults are Reported to Police?, https://www. 
sharonlohr.com/blog/2018/9/24/how-many-sexual-assaults-are-reported-to-police [perma. 
cc/QLF4-R9UB] (last visited Aug. 20, 2020). 
110 MORGAN 2018, supra note 108, at 1; MORGAN 2017, supra note 109, at 8.  
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some surveys is a version of “I didn’t think it was important enough.”111 The 
bottom line is that we know many victims of sexual crimes do not report 
them, but we are less certain of the precise percentage, or of the relative 
importance of the various possible reasons why they do not report. 
 Does the reporting rate matter? Appreciating that sexual crimes occur 
more often than indicated by arrest statistics may heighten our desire to 
combat them, or pursue reforms that might encourage victims to report, on 
the plausible assumption that more reporting would lead to more arrests and 
thus more deterrence. But it does not say much about how to deal with those 
who are arrested. It’s hard to see, for example, why the sentence imposed on 
an individual convicted of a sexual crime should be affected by sexual crime 
reporting rates rather than by the facts of that particular defendant’s crime.  
 The question we address here is whether reporting rates matter in 
evaluating either the constitutionality or the advisability of the registry 
regime. At least one federal appeals court has suggested they might. 112 The 
court considered whether requiring those convicted of most sexual crimes to 
wear location monitoring ankle bracelets the rest of their life was an 
unreasonable search barred by the Fourth Amendment. The court thought a 
 
111 In a 2015 survey of college students conducted for the Association of American 
Universities, 59% of the “victims of nonconsensual sexual contact by physical force or 
incapacitation” who had not reported the incident, offered this explanation. DAVID CANTOR, 
HYUNSHIK LEE, BONNIE FISHER, CAROL BRUCE, SUSAN CHIBNALL, GAIL THOMAS & 
REANNE TOWNSEND, REPORT ON THE AAU CAMPUS CLIMATE SURVEY ON SEXUAL ASSAULT 
AND SEXUAL MISCONDUCT 110 tbl. 6–1 (2015), https://www.aau.edu/key-issues/aau-
climate-survey-sexual-assault-and-sexual-misconduct-2015?id=16525 [perma.cc/HN6F-
LQBE]. An equivalent explanation (“not important enough to report”) was the common 
reason given for not reporting sexual assaults in a victimization survey of the Canadian 
population conducted 16 years earlier. That was equally true, however, for most other 
categories of crime considered in that survey. SANDRA BESSERER & CATHERINE TRAINOR, 
CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN CANADA, 1999 11–12 (2000), https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/ 
n1/en/pub/85-002-x/85-002-x2000010-eng.pdf?st=3vyWcQ4h [perma.cc/3UC4-V7YY]. 
 The National Crime Victimization Survey also asks women to identify the reason 
for not reporting a rape or sexual assault. “Fear of reprisal” was the “most important reason” 
while “[p]olice would not [or could not] do anything to help was the reason identified by 8% 
of respondents. Only 7% of respondents said the assault was “[n]ot important enough” to 
report, although 23% said they did not report because it was a “[p]ersonal matter.” MICHAEL 
PLANTY, LYNN LANGTON, CHRISTOPHER KREBS & MARCUS BERZOFSKY, FEMALE VICTIMS 
OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE, 1994-2010, at 7 tbl. 9 (2013), https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/ 
pub/pdf/fvsv9410.pdf [perma.cc/5FH9-ZTRW]. Varying methodologies, samples, and 
response rates undoubtedly explain the varying counts. E.g., SHARON L. LOHR, MEASURING 
CRIME 97–111 (2019) (“Many of the differences among estimates of sexual assault from 
surveys can be explained by the methods used to collect the data and measure sexual 
assault”). 
112 See, e.g., Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929, 934 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Although non-sex offenders 
had a higher rearrest rate (68%) than sex offenders and only 3% of child molesters were 
rearrested for a child-molestation offense, these numbers don’t take account of the very high 
rate of underreporting of sex offenses.”). The opinion was written by Posner. 




low reporting rate for sexual offenses supported its conclusion that the search 
was reasonable, because it meant the sexual re-offending was more common 
than official crime statistics indicated, and so also then was the threat to 
public safety the rule meant to address. The greater threat was thought to add 
justification for rules burdening registrants subject to them.113  
 A recent article, The Dark Figure of Sexual Recidivism, goes 
further.114 It argues the social science studies often cited in legal challenges 
to the registry regime are flawed because they employ official crime statistics 
that necessarily miss unreported offenses. The article has been cited in 
litigation in response to parties citing those social science studies.115 Dark 
Figure focuses on constructing a mathematical model meant to estimate the 
magnitude of the “missed” offenses.116 The article concludes the proportion 
of sexual offenses not reported is much higher than the Crime Victimization 
surveys suggest. It argues that the scholarly consensus about re-offense rates 
is therefore wrong.117 While the authors “take no position” on the “propriety” 
of the registration regime,118 they conclude it is “untenable” for researchers 
to rely on “official crime statistics” and inappropriate for policymakers to 
employ well-validated actuarial risk assessment instruments that predict only 
“observed” re-offending.119  
 But what facts about crime rates should policymakers, judges, and 
scholars rely upon if not the known facts about reported sexual crimes? The 
authors’ implicit answer is that they should instead rely on the estimates of 
unknown facts offered by their model. That is a bad idea for two reasons. The 
first is that their model is flawed, so there is no reason to credit their 
heightened estimates of the number of unreported sexual offenses. That point 
is well-made in critiques by others120 which I briefly capsule below. My 
primary focus, however, is on a threshold question to which neither judges  
 
 
113 Id. at 933–34. 
114 Scurich & John, supra note 11. 
115 E.g., Reply Brief For Intervenor Office of Attorney General at 4–6, Commonwealth v. 
Torsilieri, 232 A.3d 567 (2020) (No. 2148 EDA 2019) (citing Scurich and John’s article, The 
Dark Figure of Sexual Recidivism, to challenge the assumptions that recidivism rates among 
sex offenders are low).  
116 Scurich & John, supra note 11, at 164–66. 
117 Id. at 172. 
118 Id. at 160. 
119 Id. at 172. 
120 Tamara Rice Lave, J.J. Prescott & Grady Bridges, The Problem with Assumptions: 
Revisiting “The Dark Figure of Sexual Recidivism,” 39 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 279 (2020). A 
second piece making many of the same observations was written concurrently although 
published earlier; it is consistent with the analysis of Lave, Prescott, and Bridges. Brian R. 
Abbott, Illuminating the Dark Figure of Sexual Recidivism, 38 BEHAV. SCI. LAW 543, 546 
(2020).  
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nor Dark Figure gives attention: does the sexual offense reporting rate even 
matter in any legal or policy analysis of the registry regime? I conclude it 
does not matter, which is the second reason to ignore the Dark Figure 
estimates. We now consider these two reasons in turn. 
 
A. Flaws in the Dark Figure Model Make Its Estimates Misleading 
 
 The recent critique by Lave, Prescott and Bridges identifies several 
critical defects in the Dark Figure model. The model assumes the likelihood 
of a registrant re-offending does not change over the years following release 
from custody121 despite ample data showing it does (because the probability 
of reoffending declines for each arrest-free year following release from 
custody122).  It assumes victims who know the perpetrator was previously 
convicted of a sexual crime are no more likely to report the crime against 
them,123 an implausible assumption for reasons I explore below.  It does not 
take account of the fact that those convicted of a sexual offense vary in their 
propensity to re-offend, even though it purports to.124 And fourth, the model’s 
estimates of the number of missed offenses are based on data from a skewed 
sample of re-offense studies, some of which are misread.125  
 The model also assumes the likelihood of the police knowing of a 
crime is unaffected by whether the perpetrator is a repeat or one-time 
offender.126 But it’s more plausible to assume that those who commit multiple 
sexual crimes are more likely to be caught and convicted, at least once, than 
are one-time offenders, and that once police identify the perpetrator of one 
sex crime, the chance rises that they will identify others he or she committed. 
In that case the missed offenses Dark Figure attempts to estimate consist 
disproportionately of those committed by one-time offenders whose 
apprehension is less important, for preventing future offenses, than is 
catching repeat offenders (although of course one-time offenders also deserve 




121 Scurich & John, supra note 11, at 167; Lave, Prescott & Bridges, supra note 121, at 11. 
122 E.g., Hanson et al., Reductions in Risk, supra note 97. 
123 Scurich & John, supra note 11 at 167; Lave, Prescott & Bridges, supra note 121 at 14–
17. 
124 Lave, Prescott & Bridges, supra note 121  at 17–20. 
125 The study looks primarily at a skewed sample of older studies with small sample sizes 
while ignoring more recent ones with larger sample sizes. Id. at 286. Additionally, the study 
assumes the reported re-offense rates use only convictions and must therefore be adjusted 
upward—because convictions do not always follow from arrest for actual offenses, when in 
fact, some studies measured re-offending by counting arrests instead. Id. at 6. 
126 Scurich & John, supra note 11, at 171. 




B. The Overall Sex Crime Reporting Rate Does Not Affect the Legal or Policy 
Analysis of the Registry Regime  
 
 1. Reporting rates matter only if they are different for different groups 
 
 The standard estimates of unreported offenses provided by the 
National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) cannot distinguish reporting 
rates for sexual offenses committed by registrants from reporting rates for 
sexual offenses committed by others because victims are not asked whether 
the perpetrator of the offense they identify in the survey was a registrant. Nor 
would respondents necessarily know the answer if asked. The estimates of 
unreported offenses provided by the Dark Figure model reflect that same 
limitation. The model estimates only overall reporting rates; it cannot and 
does not estimate reporting rates for offenses committed by registrants 
separately from those committed by others. Indeed, the paper never considers 
whether the reporting rate for crimes committed by registrants might differ 
from the reporting rate for crimes committed by others; its analysis silently 
assumes they are the same. But that same-reporting-rate assumption renders 
their model irrelevant to the legal or policy analysis of the registry regime. 
That is because the regime’s premise is that registrants pose a much greater 
threat of sexual offending than does everyone else, thus justifying our focus 
on them. But if reporting rates for crimes committed by registrants and non-
registrants are the same, then we need look only at reported offenses to test 
that premise. Thus, the same-reporting-rate assumption underlying the Dark 
Figure model renders its results irrelevant to questions addressed by the 
social science studies it purports to cast doubt on.  
 For example, consider the studies showing that about 95% of all 
reported sexual offenses are committed by those with no prior sexual crime 
conviction. If we assume reporting and conviction rates for offenses 
committed by those with prior sex crime convictions are no different than for 
offenses committed by those without them, simple arithmetic tells us that we 
would get the same 95% result if we could somehow count unreported 
offenses too. Or consider the studies that show that re-offense rates for 
registrants are lower than were historically assumed, such as the federal study 
of released state prisoners described above.127 Counting unreported offenses 
could have no effect on the finding that those with no sexual crime history 
commit 84% of all rapes and sexual assaults committed by released prisoners, 
or that released robbers commit such crimes at nearly half the rate of released 
rapists. Including unreported crimes in the count would raise the total 
number, but the proportion accounted for by each group remains the same if 
the reporting rate for the groups are the same.  
 
127 See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text. 
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 Finally, consider the various studies that assess whether public 
websites listing registrants, or rules controlling where they may live or go, 
reduce the rate of sexual offending. Because controlled experimentation is 
not possible, these studies must rely on naturally arising differences. This 
typically means comparing outcomes before and after the imposition of a law, 
or comparing outcomes between otherwise similar jurisdictions with 
different laws.128 What’s compared is the rate of known sexual offenses with 
and without the registry regime rule under study. Assume the study finds no 
difference in the rate of reported offenses with and without the rule. Would it 
matter if the study also included estimates of unreported offenses in its 
calculation of rates? Not if the proportion of all sexual offenses that are 
reported is the same for both groups. The offense rates would still be the same 
with and without the rule. And that’s true whether the reporting rate is 75%, 
50%, or 25%, so long as it is the same for both. 
 The key point is that any evaluation of the efficacy of the registry 
regime necessarily depends upon the relative crime rates between groups, not 
their absolute level of overall offending. That’s not to say the absolute level 
of offending across all groups does not matter for any purpose. Of course it 
does. The more often a bad thing happens, the more reason we have to combat 
it. But the question here is whether the registry regime is an effective combat 
strategy, and the underreporting phenomenon cannot affect our assessment of 
its efficacy unless the reporting rate differs depending upon registry status.  
 
 2. Registrant offense rates must be assessed by comparing them to the 
offense rates of other apt population groups, not to zero  
 
 To consider whether a sexual offense rate is high or low one must 
have a benchmark to which to compare it, because nothing is high or low 
except in comparison to something else. That’s true whether one’s talking 
about blood pressure, interest rates, batting averages, or crime rates. Is an air 
temperature of fifty degrees high or low?  The answer depends on whether 
the benchmark is the average temperature in January or July. Of course, in 
casual conversation people often say something is high or low without 
explicitly identifying a benchmark, but the benchmark is usually implied. 
Someone who says “public school teacher salaries are low” doesn’t mean 
they’re low because brain surgeons earn more, but because they are lower 
than other occupations the speaker believes comparable. Any debate over 
teacher salaries necessarily becomes a debate about the apt comparison 
group.  
 The silent assumption that often lies behind claims that the sexual 
offense rate of registrants is high is that the appropriate benchmark against 
 
128 E.g., Agan, supra note 78; NAPIER ET AL., supra note 78; Zgoba, Veysey & Dalessandro, 
supra note 78; Bouffard & Askew, supra note 78. 




which to compare their offense rate is zero. But zero cannot be an appropriate 
benchmark because there is no apt comparison group of non-registrants with 
a zero sexual offense rate. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently 
concluded when offered the analysis in Dark Figure, “the relevant question 
should not be whether convicted sexual offenders are committing unreported 
sexual crimes, but rather whether sexual offenders commit more sexual 
crimes than other groups not subject to similar registration laws.”129 That is 
a key insight. Registrant sexual offense rates must be compared to the sexual 
offense rate of an apt comparison group that is similarly situated but not 
subjected to the registry regime.  
 The comparison group employed by leading scholars in this area is 
released felons with no history of sexual offending (to whom the registry 
regime is not applied).130 Useful comparisons must also take account of the 
fact that registrants are not a homogenous group. Some sexual offenses have 
lower re-offense rates than others, and within offense categories, individual 
re-offense likelihood varies in measurable ways.131 Good empirical studies 
allow one to separate registrants into groups based on re-offense risk. Nor is 
the composition of these risk groups static. As we have seen, the re-offense 
risk of registrants, like that of other released felons, declines rapidly over time 
at liberty without having re-offended. That means the offense risk of most 
registrants (all but those who start out with a higher risk than most other 
registrants) will fall below the benchmark comparison rate within five or ten 
years after release.132 Even if some registry regime rules were effective, there 
is no explanation for applying them to subgroups of registrants who pose no 
more risk than does the comparison group not subject to those rules.  
 In sum, both legal and policy analysis of the registry regime must 
compare the sexual offense rates of particular groups of registrants to the rate 
of an apt comparison group of non-registrants, not to zero. The proportion of 
sexual offenses that are reported can have no effect on such comparisons 
unless the proportions of offenses that are reported differ among the groups 
being compared. While Dark Figure assumes they do not (thus rendering its 
analysis irrelevant) we now consider the possibility that they do.  
 
 3. The rate of unreported sexual offenses may vary with the 
characteristics of the offense 
 
 Because unreported crimes will not lead to arrest, comparing the 
arrest rates of two groups is misleading if offenses by one group are reported 
less often than the other’s. If registrants’ offenses were reported at a lower 
 
129 Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, 232 A.3d 567, 595 (Pa. 2020). 
130 Hanson et al., Reductions in Risk, supra note 97 , at 49. 
131 See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text. 
132 See supra notes 97–101 and accompanying text.  
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rate than those committed by others, then registrant arrest rates would 
understate their offense risk, relative to the risk posed by others. On the other 
hand, if registrants’ offenses are reported at a higher rate than offenses 
committed by others, then comparing the two groups’ arrest rates would 
overstate the registrants’ relative sexual offense risk. The problem is 
potentially worse if one compares sexual crime convictions rather than 
arrests. The additional steps necessary to get from arrest to conviction can 
also differ across comparison groups. If arrested registrants are less likely to 
be convicted than are others arrested for a sexual offense, then comparing the 
two groups’ sexual offense convictions will understate registrants’ relative 
risk (assuming no difference between groups in the percentage of arrestees 
who in fact committed the charged crime). But if arrested registrants are more 
likely to be convicted than are others arrested, such comparisons overstate 
their relative risk. They might be convicted at higher rates even though they 
do not actually offend at higher rates, because their offenses more often lead 
to conviction. The Dark Figure model attempts to estimate actual offense 
rates by correcting both arrest and conviction rates to include not only 
offenses committed but unreported, but also reported offenses that really 
happened but did not lead to conviction. But as previously noted, its estimates 
are for sexual offenses overall, not sexual offenses broken down by offender 
groups.  
 The model thus implicitly assumes (as Lave, Prescott and Bridges 
observe) that a perpetrator’s previous conviction for a sexual offense has no 
effect on either the likelihood that a victim will report the offense, or that the 
perpetrator will be arrested, prosecuted, or convicted for it.133 It assumes the 
gap between offenses actually committed and offenses resulting in an arrest 
and conviction is the same for both groups. Is this same-gap assumption 
correct? Because there is no data on the number of unreported offenses 
broken down by whether the perpetrator has a prior offense, we cannot 
answer that question definitively. But we can make an informed guess. 
Shortly after Dark Figure was released this author commented that 
reasonable inferences about police conduct suggest registrant offenses are 
more likely to lead to arrest than offenses committed by others.134 And Lave, 
Prescott, and Bridges have since explained more fully why the same-gap 
assumption is almost certainly wrong.135 
 
133 Lave, Prescott & Bridges, supra note 121, at 282. 
134 Dark Figure was noted in the widely followed Sentencing Law and Policy Blog shortly 
after it became publicly accessible on SSRN. The author’s observation was part of his 
comment to that initial blogpost. Ira Ellman, Comment to The Dark Figure of Sexual 
Recidivism, SENTENCING L. & POL’Y (Feb. 18, 2019), https://sentencing.typepad.com/senten 
cing_law_and_policy/2019/02/the-dark-figure-of-sexual-recidivism.html#comments 
[perma.cc/6M6C-GKNU]. 
135 Lave, Prescott & Bridges, supra note 120, at 287–88. 




 A victim’s decision to report a sexual offense cannot be affected by 
the perpetrator’s prior conviction unless the victim knows if the perpetrator 
has a prior conviction. Where perpetrator and victim are strangers, the victim 
is unlikely to know. But strangers accounted for only 15.5% of sexual assaults 
on adult women known to law enforcement authorities in 2016.136 Most 
perpetrators are known to their victims because they are current or previous 
intimate partners, or acquaintances, friends, co-workers, or family 
members.137 Victims won’t always know about the prior conviction of these 
groups either, but sometimes they will. There’s reason to think such 
knowledge makes reporting more likely. Two common explanations victims 
give for not reporting are fear they won’t be believed or fear they will be 
blamed themselves for the assault.138 Knowledge that the perpetrator has a 
prior sexual offense conviction may reduce those fears.  
 Consider next reported offenses that lead to no arrest because no 
perpetrator is identified. That’s obviously more likely when the perpetrator is 
a stranger whose identification depends upon police investigation. The police 
effort to identify a perpetrator will surely include looking at lists of local 
sexual offenders taken from the registry or from police records. Either source 
will include fingerprints, so that where the perpetrator left a print, those with 
prior sexual offenses will be identified. Indeed, the increasingly routine 
collection of DNA samples from those convicted of a crime139 may allow the 
police to quickly identify and thus pursue perpetrators in any current case in 
which DNA evidence is available, again increasing the likelihood that those 
with prior convictions, but not first offenders, are eventually prosecuted. And 
finally, successful prosecutions are also more likely where the defendant has 
a prior sex crime conviction.140 Knowing that, prosecutors are of course more 
likely to prosecute these cases in the first place. 
 In sum, it seems reasonable to infer that a) victims are more likely to 
report sexual offenses committed by perpetrators whom they know have a 
prior sexual offense conviction; b) police are more likely to follow up on 
reports by victims who identify the perpetrator as someone with a prior; c) 
police are more likely to identify and thus arrest perpetrators with prior sexual 
offenses; d) prosecutors are more likely to file charges and win convictions 
in cases in which the alleged perpetrator has a prior sexual offense conviction. 
 
136 Easy Access to NIBRS Victims 2016: Victims of Violence, supra note 69. 
137 Katrin Hohl & Elisabeth A. Stanko, Complaints of Rape and the Criminal Justice System: 
Fresh Evidence on the Attrition Problem in England and Wales, 12 EUR. J. CRIMINOLOGY 
324, 328 (2015). 
138 See Kruttschnitt, supra note 106, at 38 (citing a Bureau of Justice Statistics report that 
found some victims did not report to the police out of a belief that the police would not help 
them). 
139 See People v. Buza, 413 P.3d 1132, 1155 (Cal. 2018) (approving the use of a cheek swab 
to obtain a DNA specimen as part of a routine booking procedure). 
140 Lave, Prescott & Bridges, supra note 121, at 293–94. 
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I know of no data that would allow one to test these inferences, but they 
certainly seem more plausible than the same-gap assumption silently made 
by the Dark Figure model. And if that implausible same-gap assumption is 
indeed wrong, then registrants’ sexual offense rates, relative to the rate of 




 The registry regime regulates the lives of nearly a million Americans 
who are not in custody, not on parole or post-release supervision of any kind, 
who have committed no crimes since completing whatever sentence was once 
imposed on them for a crime that may have been committed decades earlier. 
The collection of rules, federal, state, and local, combine to make it difficult 
or impossible for registrants to find housing or employment, to travel, to 
maintain family connections, or to rejoin and contribute to their community. 
The burdens often extend to the registrants’ spouses and children. The 
regime’s debilitating rules are typically imposed for decades, and sometimes 
for life, without regard to anything a registrant may do to redeem himself.  
No remotely similar system of civic exclusion applies to people once 
convicted of any other crime, be it murder, or arson, or violent assault, or 
drug-dealing. Nor has any other western democracy adopted any similar 
regime. None of them employ the central feature of the American registry 
system, a publicly accessible database, searchable by name or locale, 
allowing anyone to obtain, for any reason or no reason, personal information 
about those with sexual offense convictions.  
Nor does it seem the registry regime can contribute to the broader 
battle against sexual abuse represented by today’s #MeToo movement. A key 
goal of that movement is recognition that sexual offending is pervasive 
because it is encouraged by an enabling culture. The solution it seeks requires 
broader cultural shifts.141 By contrast, the message of the registry regime, as 
Eric Janus points out, is that the problem is not us but “them,” a small group 
of deviant men who must be identified, contained, isolated, and ostracized 
because they have uncontrolled urges that may erupt at any time and account 
for most sexual offending.142 Shifting the onus from us to them means we can 
return to business as usual once we take care of them. The animus toward 
 
141 Deborah Rhode, #MeToo: Why Now? What Next?, 69 DUKE L.J. 377, 385–87, 401–03 
(2019). 
142 Eric Janus, Preventing Sexual Violence: Alternatives to Worrying About Recidivism, 103 
MARQ. L. REV. 819, 839–40 (2020) ("[T]he regulatory regime is premised on the serial 
predator model, and this empirically inaccurate portrayal of sexual violence makes invisible 
the pain of the victims who have been harmed by people who do not fit the serial predator 
paradigm, and the victims whose harm could have been prevented by policies framed to 
address the real problem, rather than the mythical serial predator."). 




them, born of understandable if nonrational fears, may also be a convenient 
strategy for those resistant to the cultural changes the #MeToo movement 
seeks. It enlists the disgust and anger that is easily aroused against individuals 
associated with a small group of particularly heinous offenses to divert 
attention from discussion of the larger cultural changes that would affect 
many more of us. So, registry reform is not inconsistent with the goals of the 
#MeToo movement. Indeed, shifting resources from the ineffective registry 
regime to sexual abuse preventative strategies that have been found 
promising, would advance the movement’s goals. 
Registry rules were born of understandable fears, the laws 
establishing them named for the victims of terrible crimes. But laws that 
focus such harms on a discrete and widely despised group must be justified 
by facts, not fears. We have seen that justifying facts are hard to find. Why 
then does the registry regime persist? As Eula Biss observed, in her study of 
those who refuse vaccinations, our “fears are dear to us. When we encounter 
information that contradicts our beliefs, we tend to doubt the information, not 
ourselves.”143 But as understandable as that is as a matter of human 
psychology, the law must demand more than fears before inflicting deep 
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